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FCC v. Midwest Video Corporation:
One Less Cable Restraint
I. INTRODUCTION
A controversial aspect of the Federal Communications Commission's
(FCC) regulation of cable television was squelched by the United States
Supreme Court in Federal Communications Commission v. Midwest
Video Corporation (Midwest Video I1).' As will be shown, the holding of
Midwest Video H is not as broad as it may appear at first glance, and its
value as a guide to future Court treatment of FCC cable regulation is thus
diminished.
At issue in Midwest Video II were the FCC's rules2 requiring most
cable systems to expand their channel capacity and to devote at least one
channel to public access use. Public access users were to be any local third
parties who wished to produce and transmit their own programming
through the use of a cable system's facilities. The FCC rules specifically
prohibited cable operators from interfering with or in any other way
censoring these public access programs, save for obscenities, commercial
messages, and lottery information.3 Cable operators were further required
to make at least one access channel and all necessary production
equipment available free of charge to public access users on a
nondiscriminatory, first-come basis. The remaining access channels, if
any, were to be open to public access use for a nominal charge.4
In the court of appeals, respondent cable operators had successfully
challenged5 these aspects of the FCC rules as imposing common carrier
requirements on them in violation of section 3(h)6 of the Communications
Act, which reads: "[A] person engaged in radio broadcasting7 shall not,
insofar as such person is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier."
Section 3(h) is of little help in spelling out just what is a common
carrier, since its definition is circular: " '[c]ommon carrier' or 'carrier'
means any person engaged as a common carrier for hire . . ..
Accordingly, in sustaining the Eighth Circuit's decision against the
FCC, the Supreme Court refined the meaning of common carrier status;
I. 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
2. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.252-258 (1977).
3. 47 C.F.R. § 76.256(b), (d) (1977).
4. 47 C.F.R. § 76.256(c), (d) (1977).
5. Midwest Video Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978).
6. 47 U.S.C. § 153 (h) (1976).
7. "Radio broadcasting" has been held to include over-the-air television broadcasting and cable
transmissions. 440 U.S. at 696-98.
8. 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1976).
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"[w]ith its access rules . . . the Commission has transferred control of the
content of access cable channels from cable operators to members of the
public who wish to communicate by the cable medium. Effectively, the
Commission has relegated cable systems, pro tanto, to common-carrier
status."9 The Court went on to reiterate the FCC's own definition of a
communications common carrier as one that offers its facilities in such a
way that "all members of the public who choose to employ such facilities
may communicate or transmit intelligence of their own design and
choosing ... "'0
In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National
Committee1" (CBS), relied on by the Court in Midwest Video I, the Court
analyzed the legislative history of the statutory common carrier provision,
noting that Congress had inserted the common carrier prohibition in
section 3(h) of the Act in order "to preserve the values of private
journalism."' 2 The Court in CBS viewed the choice as one between
government and private censorship, with Congress legislatively opting for
the less pervasive private censorship. 13 Midwest Video Hdoes not treat the
question whether the access rules, which on their face bar private
censorship by cable operators, in fact impose some form of governmental
censorship. It can be argued, however, that the FCC rules result in no
censorship at all, save for the obscenity, lottery, and commercial message
prohibitions.
The Court had previously upheld steadily increasing jurisdictional
claims made by the FCC over cable television 14 that had been made in the
absence of specific statutory authority.1 5 In United States v. Southwestern
Cable Co.,' 6 the Court found FCC power over cable in the very broad
language of the Communications Act, but limited such regulatory power
to that which is "reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the
Commission's . . . regulation of television broadcasting."1 7 Four years
later, in United States v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video 1),'" a
closely divided court upheld an FCC regulation 9 that forced certain cable
systems to originate their own programs in addition to merely carrying the
9. 440 U.S. at 700-01.
10. Id. at 701.
11. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
12. Id. at 109.
13. Id. at 105, 116.
14. The term "cable television" includes several methods for generating or retransmitting
programs-all having in common the final distribution by coaxial cable to individual homes-in
contrast to regular radio and television broadcast stations, which transmit their programs over-the-air
to the antennae of individual radio and television receivers. The capacity (number of channels) of over-
the-air broadcasting is limited by natural phenomena, while the capacity of cable TV is theoretically
vast. W. FRANCOIS, MASS MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION 291 (1975).
15. Cable television is not mentioned in the Communications Act.
16. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
17. Id. at 178.
18. 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
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signals of broadcast stations. Midwest Video Icontinued the "reasonably
ancillary" rule ° and added a second requirement-that any FCC
regulation of cable systems support the public interest.2 ' In both
Southwestern Cable and Midwest Video I, the Court invoked the
"reasonably ancillary" test in the absence of specific statutory authority.22
Midwest Video II appears to have continued application of the
"reasonably ancillary" test. It is difficult to understand, however, why
application of this test was necessary in Midwest Video I in light of the
Court's finding that the access rules at issue were proscribed by the
common carrier language of section 3(h).23 Having found Congress'
"outright rejection of a broad right of public access on a common-carrier
basis, '24 to be controlling on the validity of the FCC rules, the case would
appear to have been decided at that point. As a result, the Court's
subsequent consideration of the reasonable ancillarity of the access rules
must be considered dictum. In contrast to the Eighth Circuit, the Court
refused to consider the first amendment rights of cable operators, although
it hinted that the issue is "not frivolous. 25
II. THE BACKDROP AGAINST WHICH Midwest Video II WAS DECIDED
The growth of the cable television industry has been explosive.2 6
There were 2,678 systems in operation at the time Midwest Video Iwas de-
cided.27 Current figures show 4,000 operating systems and 1,200 more ap-
proved but not operating. 2 The 12.8 million subscribing households ac-
count for as many as 40 million viewers-18 percent of the television
audience in the United States.29
The FCC's regulation of cable has not been as consistent. While the
first commercial cable system was established in 1950,30 it was not until
1965 that the Commission adopted rules31 regulating cable and asserting
its jurisdiction over all cable systems.32 These rules were adopted in large
19. 47 C.F.R. § 76.201(a) (1972). This provision was subsequently removed.
20. 406 U.S. at 663.
21. Id. at 671.
22. In Southwestern Cable, the Court found justification for FCC regulation of cable television
in the broad language of the Communications Act to the effect that the Act applies to" 'all interstate
and foreign communication by wire or radio. .. ' 47 U.S.C. § 152(a)." 392 U.S. at 167.
23. 440 U.S. at 691, 708.
24. Id. at 708.
25. Id. at 709 n.19. In addition to avoiding a constitutional issue, this result also avoids any
balancing of the first amendment rights of potential access channel users with those of cable operators.
26. United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. at 651.
27. Id. at 651 n.2.
28. BROADCASTING CABLE SOURCEBOOK 7 (1979).
29. Id.
30. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 162.
31. 1 F.C.C.2d 453 (1965).
32. M. HAMBURG, ALL ABOUT CABLE: LEGAL AND BusINEsS AspEcTs OF CABLE AND PAY
TELEVISION 13 (1979).
1980]
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
part to protect broadcasters from the perceived threat of the emerging
cable TV industry.33 Broadcasters had claimed that unrestricted growth of
cable TV would jeopardize their investments and revenues.34 It was these
rules that led to the Southwestern Cable case31 in 1968, in which the Court
found "broad authority" for extending the FCC'sjurisdiction to include all
cable systems, albeit within the reasonably ancillary test.36 In 1972 the
Commission adopted what are basically the rules governing federal
regulation of cable television today.37 When the Court considered the
mandatory programming origination rule in Midwest Video 1,38 the swing
vote in the 5-4 decision was Chief Justice Burger's concurrence, in which he
found that the Commission had "strain[ed] the outer limits" of its
jurisdiction. 39 The Chief Justice, however, reluctantly deferred to the
judgment of the Commission.40
The 1972 rules4' had included somewhat more stringent public access
requirements than those struck down in Midwest Video II. In 1976,
however, cable operators obtained a dilution of these rules and a deadline
extension.42
One year later, a proponent of deregulation was in the White House.
The person that President Carter appointed to chair the FCC has been
quoted to the effect that deregulation is "the new religion in
[Washington]". 43 In Congress, the -massive proposed rewrite44 of the
Communications Act exempted cable television from federal regulation,
and prohibited all state and local regulation as well.45 In April 1979, the
FCC initiated rulemaking that would delete current restrictions, designed
46to protect broadcasters, on cable's ability to import distant television
programs, and would soften certain exclusivity rules that limited cable's
competition with local broadcast stations.47 In a separate statement
33. D. LEDuc, CABLE TELEVISION AND THE FCC: A CRISIS IN MEDIA CONTROL 1-2, 137-39
(1973).
34. Id. at 137-38.
35. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
36. Id. at 178.
37. 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972).
38. 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
39. Id. at 676.
40. Id.
41. Cable Television Report and Order, 37 Fed. Reg. 3252, 3289-90 (1972).
42. Four access channels were originally required; this was subsequently modified to require
only one access channel in many cases. The compliance deadline was extended from March, 1977 to
June, 1986. Report and Order in Docket No. 20528, 59 F.C.C.2d 294 (1976). 47 C.F.R. § 76.252-258
(1979).
43. BROADCASTING 25 (June 11, 1979), quoting FCC Chairman Charles Ferris. His view con-
tinues to be widely held: "[tlhe gospel of deregulation is winning more and more converts in govern-
ment." Wall St. J., Sept. 4, 1979, at 1, col. 6.
44. H.R. 3333. A less sweeping deregulatory bill, H.R. 6121, has been substituted for H.R. 3333.
38 CONG. Q. 389, 389 (1980).
45. CABLE TELEVISION INFORMATION CENTER, NOTES FROM THE CENTER I (May, 1979).
46. LEDuc, supra note 33, 137-58.
47. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in Docket No. 20988, 71 F.C.C.2d 951 (May, 1979).
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supporting the philosophy behind this piece of proposed deregulation, the
FCC chairman wrote: "[in regulating cable] we have attempted to put our
finger in one hole of a dike which is looking more and more like a sieve, as
over the air TV, video cassettes and discs, teletext and viewdata are all
beginning to offer more video diversity.
48
In this deregulation climate, Midwest Video II seems more like an
endorsement of current government stance and less like a defeat for the
FCC. The true losers would appear to be the broadcasters, whose fears of
cable competition have been a keystone of the FCC's policy of limiting
cable's power.49 Following Midwest Video II, cable operators have one less
restraint. Also affected by the decision are potential users of access
channels. One commentator claims that the emergence of a broad class of
access users will result from Midwest Video 1,5° while another cites
problems of financing and apathy that have prevented effective use of
locally mandated access channels."
Whatever its failings, the access movement was launched in pursuit of
the same target as cable television in general: diversity.52 Cable has been
seen as the answer to the dominance by the three major networks of most
over-the-air programming. In practice, the FCC has had to force cable
operators to offer more than a re-channelling of over-the-air programs by
requiring them to originate some programs of their own.53 The rules struck
down in Midwest Video Hwere also aimed at diversity.54 In addition to the
provision of local access channels, most cable systems were required to
enlarge their overall capacity from twelve to twenty channels.5 The Court
expressly rejected the Commission's argument that these rules be
considered apart from the access rules, and, as a result, the Court struck
down the whole package. 6 Whatever the prospects for cable diversity may
have been, Midwest Video 11 has arguably dimmed them.
Cable operators have been subject to a wide number of state and local
48. Id. at 1001.
49. Note, FCCs Cable Television Jurisdiction: Deregulation by Judicial Fiat, 30 U. FLA. L.
REV. 718, 726-27 (1978). If the current deregulatory movement were to remove a public policy
underpinning of the FCC's regulation of cable-protection of the broadcast industry-it could lead to
judicial reassessment of the Commission's jurisdiction over cable. See United States v. Southwestern
Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 177 (1968).
In a court of appeals case, it was held that the reasonably ancillary test is relevant only when cable
practices threaten the existence of broadcasting. Otherwise, the test is one of "long-established
regulatory goals." Home Box Office, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 567 F.2d 9, 27-29
(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). See generally Comment, Home Box Office, Inc. v.
F.C.C., 27 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 432 (1978).
50. CABLE TELEVISION INFORMATION CENTER, NOTES FROM THE CENTER 6 (November, 1978).
51. B. SCHMIDT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS VERSUS PUBLIC ACCESS 207-10 (1976).
52. Report and Order in Docket No. 20508,59 F.C.C.2d 294,298 (1976), quoted in 440 U.S. at
694-95.
53. See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra.
54. See note 52 supra.
55. 47 C.F.R. § 76.252 (1979).
56. 440 U.S. at 708 n.18.
1980]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
regulatory agencies in addition to the FCC.5 7 Midwest Video Hmay create
a vacuum by eliminating this area of federal preemption. For instance, one
of the invalidated rules prohibited local authorities from requiring more
access capacity. 8 Local regulators are now presumably free to negotiate
greater access services than those just overcome in Midwest Video II. For
some cable operators, the victory could prove to be a pyrrhic one.
For broadcasters, Midwest Video f's holding may have a familiar
ring. In its 1973 CBS decision,59 the Court rejected common carrier
obligations for broadcasters in its refusal to rigidly enforce the FCC's
fairness doctrine.60 The Court held that requiring broadcasters to accept
all advertising whenever they accept some advertising would not only
misconstrue the fairness doctrine, but would also have common-carriage
implications.61 It found consistent congressional rejection of common
carrier status for broadcast licensees beginning with the legislative debates
surrounding the original Radio Act of 1927. 2 The Midwest Video Hcourt
for the first time invoked the same pattern of Congressional disapproval
and statutory proscription of common carrier status in the areas of cable
63television.
Justice Stevens' Midwest Video II dissent questioned the Court's
application of the common carrier issue in some previous decisions.
Stevens pointed out that, in Midwest Video I, the Court had upheld the
mandatory origination-of-local-programming rule, which the FCC later
repealed because it believed that the less onerous access rules would
provide the necessary diversity. To Stevens, the majority in Midwest Video
11 was voiding less onerous versions of what it had upheld in Midwest
Video L64 This argument loses weight when one considers that it is the
FCC, not the Court, that has deemed the access rules less onerous. This
finding is surely no more binding on the Court than the FCC's
proclamation that the access rules do not impose common carrier
obligations. Presumably, the Court is not bound by administrative
determinations. Were it otherwise, every proposed rule could carry a
finding that it is constitutional, within an agency's jurisdiction, and so
forth.
Justice Stevens was also troubled by the Southwestern Cable prece-
dent. The rules that gave rise to Southwestern Cable required cable
systems to carry the signals of local broadcasters. To Stevens, this was a
57. COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, BROADCASTING AND CABLETELEVISION 21(1975).
58. 47 C.F.R. § 76.258 (1979).
59. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
60. Id. at 105-14.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 440 U.S. at 701-04.
64. Id. at 709-10.
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common carrier obligation that had passed muster.65 He conceded,
however, that the rules were not specifically reviewed in Southwestern
Cable. Stevens also recognized that the mandated carriage of local
broadcast signals does not fit the majority's broad definition of common
carriage, which it adopted from the FCC itself: making a "public offering
to provide [communications facilities] whereby all members of the public
who choose to employ such facilities may communicate or transmit
intelligence of their own design and choosing. ,,6
Stevens' most telling argument was his contention that "the Court has
misread the statute., 68 He pointed out that the definition of "common
carriage" in section 3(h) is found in the definitional section of the Act and
that "it does not purport to grant or deny the Commission any substantive
authority., 69 Stevens claimed that section 3(h) prohibits the Commission
from deeming a broadcast station to be a common carrier merely because it
is engaged in broadcasting. 70 He found nothing to suggest that the
Commission cannot impose an otherwise lawful obligation simply because
it "might be termed a 'common carrier obligation.' ,,71 The CBS majority,
however, marshaled impressive evidence from the congressional debates
surrounding the various communications acts. It cited several attempts to
insert common carrier obligations that were defeated because they would
have impinged on broadcast licensees' journalistic integrity. 72 Midwest
Video II incorporated the reasoning of the CBS decision.73
III. CONCLUSION
With the Midwest Video Ildecision, the cable industry seems to have
taken a crucial step in its march to equality with broadcasters. A
substantial handicap-lack of control over some of its channels-has been
removed. Additionally, forced expansion of cable channel capacity is no
longer an impending financial burden. This is not to say that cable has
received full parity with broadcasting. For one thing, the holding may be
read narrowly, with the result that the apparent continuation of the
reasonable ancillarity rule is dicta,74 thus clouding the situation.
Moreover, the Court held open the possibility that less intrusive access
rules might pass muster;75 and it refused to decide whether cable operators
65. Id. at 712-13.
66. Id. at 712 n.4.
67. Id. at 701 (brackets in original, emphasis added).
68. Id. at 710.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 711.
72. 412 U.S. at 105-10. It was unable, however, to tie these rejections directly to the language of
section 3(h).
73. 440 U.S. at 702-05.
74. See text accompanying notes 23-25 supra.
75. 440 U.S. at 705 n.14.
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enjoy the same degree ofjournalistic control as broadcasters.76 Even with
these caveats, however, cable is emerging as a more formidable competitor
for broadcast licensees. The heightened competitive stance is a victory for
proponents of deregulation as well. There is, unfortunately, no apparent
answer to the most important question: what does this mean for television
viewers?
Jon Christensen
76. Id. at 707 n.17.
